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1 INTRODUCTION 
In most countries agricultural extension has long been 
provided by a government service paid for by taxpayers. 
More recently a variety of ways to finance extension 
has emerged mainly as a result of the tendency to 
privatise government services and the increasing role 
commercial companies play in agricultural research and 
extension. This raises the question: What are the 
implications of the ways in which agricultural extension 
organisations are financed regarding the service that is 
provided to farmers? This paper addresses this question 
by focusing on the principles underlying decisions 
relating to optimal funding sources for extension. 
Since very little research has been published on this 
question to date, this paper presents a conceptual 
framework that can be used in analysing these 
implications. It also puts forward some hypotheses for 
further research, though there remains the question of 
who might be willing to fund such research. This paper 
will show that decisions regarding how extension is 
financed have important implications for farmers and 
for the development of national agriculture. 
2 FACTORS ENfFLUENCED BY THE WAYS 
IN WHICH AN EXTENSION 
ORGANISATION IS FEVANCED 
Box 1 lists the major ways in which extension organisations 
can be financed. The mechanisms through which an 
extension organisation is financed can affect the decisions 
made by the extension organisation relating to: 
• goals; 
• target groups; 
• extension methods used; 
• extension messages; 
• internal organisation; 
• cooperation with other organisations promoting 
agricultural development. 
Decisions that are made regarding these issues carry 
with them a number of implications for the ways in 
which extension supports farmers. For example, does 
one teach farmers to use technologies which incorporate 
information and skills in specific devices and products 
(seeds, agrochemicals, machinery, etc.), or the 
information arid skills of management practices?1 
Economists make a distinction between public and 
private goods. Everybody can benefit from a public good, 
i.e. it is not exclusively or excludably available to those 
who have paid for it. A public good is not subtractable, 
i.e it is still possible for others to use the good after it 
has been used by someone - this is usually the case 
with information. In contrast, only one person or 
organisation benefits from a private good. Extension is 
usually somewhere in between a public and a private 
good, but how close it is to either depends on the 
situation (Beynon et al., 1998). 
What kind of farmer decision-making is the extension 
organisation trying to influence? This might include: 
• adoption of technologies; 
• management of technologies; 
• optimal use of resources by a farmer; 
• change in farming systems; 
• changes in the supply of inputs/credit and the 
marketing of products; 
• transfer of the farm to the next generation; 
• changing from farming to another occupation; 
• collective decision-making on resource use and on 
the way farmers try to influence government policies 
(van den Ban, 1998). 
In several developing countries, e.g. India, extension 
mainly places attention on the adoption of innovations, 
while in many former communist countries most 
attention is on investment and marketing decisions. 
Farmers all over the world may need support with the 
whole range of decisions. 
Box 1 Extension organisations can be financed by: 
1. a government service paid for by taxpayers; 
2. a government service paid for by a levy on certain agricultural 
products; 
3. a commercial company selling inputs to farmers and/or 
buying their products, which in its relationship with its 
customers also uses extension; 
4. a farmers' association which pays for extension from its 
membership fees; 
5. a farmers' association which is subsidised by the government; 
6. a non-governmental organisation (NCO) which is financed 
by donations from inside or outside the country and/or by 
commercial companies for public relations purposes; 
7. an NGO which is financed by subsidies from or contracts 
with the government (either the national or a donor 
government); 
8. a consulting firm which charges a fee from the farmers, who 
are its customers; 
9. a publishing firm which sells agricultural journals or other 
publications to farmers; 
10. different combinations of the above. For example, it is 
possible for a government to pay the salaries of extension 
agents, whilst most of the operational expenses are covered 
by a farmers' association, or for a commercially-oriented 
cooperative or input-supply company to send a farm journal 
to its members/customers. 
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Box 2 Situations in which a government should 
invest in agricultural extension 
i. when the general public benefits more from extension than 
the individual participants; 
i i . for a type of extension which can be done better or cheaper 
by the government than by others; 
iii. when government agricultural development programmes can 
be made more effective if they are combined with extension; 
iv. when necessary public benefits are not sufficiently provided 
by private enterprise. 
Is decision-making within the extension programme 
centralised or decentralised? To whom are extension 
agents accountable? (Edwards and Hulme, 1996) These 
factors are interrelated; for instance information on a 
decision to adopt a technology is less excludable than 
information on the transfer of the farm to the next 
generation. 
3 WHY DO DIFFERENT ACTORS 
FINANCE AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION? 
Actors who finance an agricultural extension organisation 
do so because they see it as a method to reach their 
own goals. Since the goals of different actors in an 
agricultural knowledge and information system (AKIS) 
are different, so are their reasons for investing in 
extension. 
Government 
In an important article, Bennett (1996) analysed the 
situations in which a government should invest in 
agricultural extension. He concluded that government 
should finance agricultural extension in the four cases 
described in Box 2. Each of these situations is described 
in more detail in the paragraphs that follow, 
i. Government should invest in agricultural extension 
when the public benefits more from extension than 
the participants. Extension work on the use of 
fertilisers illustrates this point. A soil test can show 
the optimal quantity of potash fertilisers specific for 
a crop in a particular field. Nearly all the profit from 
this knowledge is for the individual farmer cultivating 
the field, which makes it hard to defend that the 
government should pay for this advice. The situation 
is different when the extension organisation tries to 
teach farmers in a community to use fertilisers at the 
optimal time. Extension agents will not have time to 
teach this to all farmers individually. Therefore they 
may discuss this at a farmers' meeting and contact 
the opinion leaders personally in the expectation 
that other farmers will follow their example. Whereas 
the soil test was a private good, through teaching 
opinion leaders extension becomes more of a public 
good. There is less reason to charge farmers for this 
information, which enables them to demonstrate to 
their neighbours that they can get higher yields by 
spreading fertilisers at the right time. Teaching 
farmers how to interpret the soil test themselves is 
another approach the extension organisation can use. 
To defend that this should be (partly) paid for by 
taxpayers one can argue that the government also 
subsidises other kinds of education and that the 
farmer who has learned how to interpret a soil test 
may teach this to his colleagues. 
There is a lot of research which shows that 
investments in agricultural research and extension 
often have a high rate of return. A major return is 
that these investments reduce the costs of producing 
food that, on a large scale, results in a reduction of 
food prices for the consumers and makes it more 
possible for farmers to compete on the world market 
(Beynon, 1998). This also decreases the need for 
the government to support prices of agricultural 
products. 
It depends on the market situation whether the 
benefits are mainly for the consumers or for the 
producers. If a country produces coffee for export 
and contributes 0.1 per cent to world production, 
increased productivity of its coffee farmers will not 
change market prices but it can increase the income 
of these farmers considerably. If a country produces 
and consumes nearly all its rice, an increase in rice 
yields will be a major benefit for consumers through 
lower prices but farm families are also consumers. 
In this case it can be very profitable for consumers 
to finance extension on rice production with the 
taxes they pay. An example is the change in milk 
production in India. Between 1978 and 1993 milk 
production in this country increased by 114 per cent 
However, the real consumer price of the milk 
decreased by 32 per cent, mainly because farmers 
learned to produce, process and market milk in a 
more efficient way thus benefiting consumers 
considerably (Candler and Kumar, 1998). 
In many countries governments have supported 
the income of their farmers by restricting the import 
of agricultural products. The regulations of the World 
Trade Organization make it increasingly difficult to 
achieve this goal in this way. Improving the 
competitiveness of fanners by financing agricultural 
research and extension may be a more effective and 
less costly way. However, voters may realise what 
they have to pay in taxes to finance research and 
extension, but not what they would pay if import 
duties on food products were raised, 
ii. Is this a kind of extension which can be done better 
or cheaper by the government than by others? One 
reason to privatise government extension services is 
that these are often bureaucratic organisations which 
are not very cost conscious. Many observers have 
noticed that government extension organisations, 
especially in developing countries, do not perform 
their role in a very efficient way. However, this does 
not imply that there are no extension roles which 
can be performed better by a government agency 
than by private consultants. 
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Bell (1998) stresses that a government extension 
organisation tries to help a community to develop, 
whereas a consulting firm helps individual farmers 
to increase their income. Without increased incomes, 
farmers are not willing to pay the consultancy fee 
which is needed by the firm to make a profit. This 
influences the choice of extension methods and of 
target groups. For example, a demonstration can be 
a very effective way of introducing improved farm 
practices in a community, but the consulting firm 
will not use this method if it cannot charge each 
farmer who learns from it. 
Usually a consulting firm will work with only a 
small proportion of the farmers and will not stimulate 
them to teach other farmers what they have learned, 
unlike government extension services who often 
encourage them to pass on knowledge. Farmers who 
learn from opinion leaders may feel less need to 
pay a consultant for his services. In a situation like 
this a government extension service may prove to 
be cheaper and better than a consulting firm. 
iii. Government agricultural development programmes 
can be made more effective if they are combined 
with extension. For instance many governments 
subsidise improvements in infrastructure, e.g. 
irrigation, in order to promote agricultural develop-
ment. These improvements open opportunities for 
farmers to increase their income by growing crops 
with a higher value. The sooner and more effectively 
they use these opportunities, the higher the rate of 
return on these investments in infrastructure. 
Extension can teach farmers to use these 
opportunities rapidly and effectively. Therefore the 
Indian government has for some years financed an 
extension programme as part of their irrigation 
projects. These investments in extension are low 
compared to the investments in the irrigation project. 
iv. Government should invest in agricultural extension 
services when public benefits which are considered 
necessary by society are not sufficiently provided 
by the private sector. For instance, much of the 
extension work on plant protection is done by 
companies selling pesticides. One would not expect 
them to teach farmers to reduce their use of pesticides 
by adopting integrated pest management (IPM), but 
in some situations lowered pesticide use is now 
possible. Since this is a change which is also desirable 
for environmental reasons the government may 
decide to finance an IPM extension programme. 
Often a goal of government policy is to decrease 
poverty. In many countries a large proportion of the 
poor are small farmers, and extension can be a way 
to decrease their poverty. Therefore a government 
extension service might, but not always does, focus 
its attention on small farmers. This is not profitable 
for a commercial company or a consulting firm, 
unless they are paid by government for working 
with this target group. 
In poor countries it is difficult for many farmers 
to find the money needed to pay for extension (e.g. 
Rasheed Sulaiman and Gadewar, 1994). A farmer 
whose family consumes 70 per cent of production 
and who sells 30 per cent, will usually not be able 
to buy the help of a consultant. From the money 
earned from sales the farmer also has to pay for 
clothes, school fees, medicines and other items 
needed by the family. For a poultry farmer in the 
Netherlands, whose family consumes 0.01 per cent 
of the eggs produced, the situation is quite different. 
Too often donors and foreign experts insist on policy 
changes which might be desirable for their home 
country but not for a developing country. 
There have been other reasons to privatise 
government agricultural extension organisations in 
industrial countries. In many of these countries the 
pricing policy results in the over-production of 
agricultural products, and it is quite expensive for the 
government to store and dispose of these surpluses. In 
this situation it does not make sense for the government 
to finance an agricultural extension service, which has 
the effect of increasing agricultural production and 
raising the cost of disposing of these surpluses, 
In many developing countries the situation is quite 
different. There the demand for agricultural products is 
increasing rapidly, both through population growth and 
through an increase in average income, which makes it 
possible to eat more expensive foods. It is often difficult 
to increase food production at the same rate as the 
increase in demand and also to find the foreign exchange 
needed to import food. Therefore a major goal of 
government policy is to increase food production (Umali 
and Schwartz, 1994). A danger in developing countries 
is the privatisation of extension services without realising 
the degree to which investments in extension can 
contribute to the national policy to meet the growing 
demand for food from local production. 
Financing agricultural extension by the government 
can work well if the goals of the agricultural policy of 
the government are felt by the farmers to be in their 
interest. In European countries this was the case shortly 
after the war when increasing agricultural production 
was a major goal. However this is no longer the case 
now the government tries to prevent the production of 
surpluses of agricultural products and is seriously 
concerned about the environmental problems caused 
by intensive farming. The extension agents can only 
achieve changes among farmers if farmers are convinced 
that it is in their interests to change. By promoting 
changes which are popular with farmers, extension 
agents can come into conflict with their employers, who 
are attempting to realise the goals of the government 
agricultural policy. This was one reason for the 
privatisation agricultural extension in the Netherlands, 
where the government expected their extension agents 
to promote environmental policies which decreased farm 
income (Tacken, 1998). 
10 
Perspectives on agricultural extension 
During the last decade budget deficits have forced 
many governments to reduce their expenditures. 
Whether this is done by reducing the extension budget 
or other budgets depends partly on political power. In 
most developing countries urban dwellers have more 
political power than those in rural areas. In many 
industrial countries the proportion of the labour force 
working in agriculture has decreased to less than five 
per cent; as a result farmers no longer have much 
political power. In addition, giving subsidies to farmers 
may be more beneficial to politicians in helping them 
to be re-elected than to improving extension. 
In most countries the government agricultural 
extension service is funded by the national government, 
but in the USA it is partly paid for by local government. 
This has the advantage that the budget of an extension 
unit depends partly on the citizens' satisfaction with the 
services provided by the local unit. If agricultural 
extension is paid by the national government, hard work 
by a group of extension agents will have very little 
influence on their budget. In this way some of the 
advantages of privatisation of extension are realised 
without resulting in the disadvantages mentioned in this 
paper. 
Commercial companies 
Commercial companies, including farmers' cooperatives, 
try to make a profit through trade. They will invest in 
extension only if they are convinced that this will 
promote their trade. It is usually in the interests of both 
the company and their customers that their products 
are used well. For example, a pesticide will not work if 
it is used on the wrong disease or applied at the wrong 
time. A farmer who uses a pesticide incorrectly may 
advise his or her colleagues against the pesticide, thus 
decreasing the sales of the pesticide company. It is 
therefore in the interest of the company to teach its 
customers how to use their products properly. 
In the long term, a cooperative or commercial 
company will only make a profit if it is able to respond 
to the needs of the market. This may make it necessary 
to teach farmers how to produce the products for which 
there is a market demand. For instance, the Tamil Nadu 
Milk Producers' Federation, an Indian cooperative, saw 
that with increasing prosperity a market developed for 
dairy products with a higher value. Since it is pnly 
possible to produce high-value dairy products from clean 
milk, the Tamil Nadu Milk Producers' Federation taught 
farmers in some villages how to produce clean milk, 
for which the Federation paid a better price. This 
extension campaign has been quite profitable both for 
the farmers in these villages and for the Federation 
(Ambalavanan, 1999). 
For a long time farmers have produced mainly bulk 
products. In other branches of the economy brands have 
been developed through which producers try to present 
the image that their particular product is of better quality 
than that of their competitors and therefore worth a 
higher price. A similar development is now evolving in 
food production, particularly for niche markets such as 
organic produce. In order to be able to guarantee the 
quality of such produce, the marketing company aims 
to control the whole chain from the producer to 
consumer, because at each link in this chain something 
might happen which reduces the quality of the product. 
In commercially-oriented agricultural production it 
is in the interests of both banks and some commercial 
companies that farmers are successful. The probability 
that a farmer is able to repay a loan from a bank depends 
on whether or not the loan has been invested for a 
good return without too much risk. Many banks have 
realised that it is profitable for them to advise their clients 
on investment decisions and sometimes also on other 
aspects of farm management. It can also be in the interest 
of input supply companies for their customers to earn 
well. In industrial countries many farmers will have to 
stop farming in the next decade because agriculture is 
no longer profitable. A particular input supply company 
wants a smaller proportion of its customers to stop 
farming than that of its competitors. This can make it 
profitable for such a company to teach its customers 
how to increase their income, e.g. by producing the 
kind and quality of products for which there is a good 
market. But commercial companies will only give their 
customers advice on a small proportion of the decisions 
farmers have to make because it is not profitable for 
them to advise on the other decisions (Schwartz, 1994). 
Farmers' associations 
Large and influential farmers' associations perform two 
main roles: (i) they try to influence collective decisions 
by the government and others in such a way that the 
interests of their members are taken into account; and 
(ii) they support their members in fields for which they 
have specialised knowledge. For example, a farmers' 
association may represent its members in a conflict with 
the government over land use regulations or tax 
assessment. 
Government decisions are increasingly taken at a 
distance from farmers, e.g. in the World Trade 
Organisation. It is difficult to show farmers that it is 
profitable for them to be a member of an association 
which is in turn a member of an organisation, which is 
itself a member of an organisation representing them at 
these top-level decisions. For the survival of the farmers' 
association it is therefore important to show the farmers 
that it pays to be a member; this is achieved by providing 
individual assistance to members, i.e. through performing 
the second role. Such assistance can be provided through 
extension, but the farmers' association should find a 
niche in the agricultural knowledge and information 
system where it has a competitive advantage over other 
actors. This will not be the same niche in all countries. 
In Denmark, for example, farmers' associations have 
long played an important role in providing advice on 
production technologies (Albrecht, 1954). Farmers' 
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associations in the Netherlands, in contrast, have given 
much attention to advice on contracts for the transfer of 
the farm to the next generation. In recent years, however, 
the advisory service of the Dutch farmers' associations 
has developed into competing consulting firms, such as 
the privatised former government extension service DLV. 
Associations of producers of a certain crop or animal 
can play a useful role in giving technical and economic 
advice to their members. Advisers of a general extension 
organisation, e.g. a department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, may lack the specialised knowledge to give 
good advice for a particular branch of agriculture. We 
see this for instance in an association of grape growers 
in India. 
Farmers' associations cannot only play a useful role 
by employing extension agents but also by putting 
pressure on research and extension organisations to work 
in a more demand-driven and client-oriented way 
(Collion and Rondot, 1998). However, one difficulty 
might be that the farmers representing the association 
are themselves relatively well educated and resource 
rich and may not fully understand the problems of 
resource-poor farmers with a low level of education 
(Likert and Lippitt, 1953). 
Consultancy and accounting firms 
Consultants who advise farmers for a fee have existed 
in many countries for a long time. They have been able 
to compete with the free advice given by government 
extension services because they visited their customers 
more frequently, providing services which an 
educational agency could not provide (e.g. as a pest 
scout) and they had more specialised knowledge of 
specific farming systems. This last point has become 
more important with the increasing specialisation among 
farmers; to some extent private veterinarians have also 
been working in this way. 
With the privatisation of government extension 
organisations the market for consultancy services has 
increased rapidly. In several countries the government 
extension organisation has been transformed into a 
commercial consultancy firm. The transformation 
required a change in attitudes of the staff members, but 
not everyone was able to make this change. In the 
Netherlands more than 60 per cent of the extension 
agents had to be replaced, mainly because they could 
not make enough profit for their firm (Duijsings, 1998). 
Having worked both as an extension agent and as a 
consultant, Bell (1998) made an interesting analysis of 
the differences between extension and consultancy: 
'extension is a process, hopefully, to successful 
development and change in a farming community', 
whereas 'consultancy is a business activity providing 
services in the market place'. 
Consultancy firms do business in the field of 
agriculture because they see a possibility to make a 
profit by advising farmers on particular issues. Farmers 
are most willing to pay for a tailor-made service, e.g. to 
help them to make decisions regarding investments and 
other issues for which they have limited experience. 
Large farmers are better able to pay the necessary 
consultancy fee than small farmers. Consultancy firms 
may also enter areas related to agriculture, particularly 
if they see possibilities for profit: a consultancy firm 
may advise a municipality on the maintenance of city 
parks, for example. It may also expand its operations 
to other countries: the former Dutch government 
extension service, DLV, now works in over 30 countries, 
helping farmers to compete with Dutch farmers. 
Many former government extension services which 
have been privatised can only make a profit if they 
have a contract with the government to do extension 
work on problems which the government considers 
important, e.g. the reduction in the use of agrochemicals. 
In several Central European countries the government 
gives farmers a voucher which they can use to pay part 
of the costs of private extension services. In Hungary 
the introduction of these vouchers has resulted in the 
establishment of a large number of small consultancy 
firms, but only those firms which are certified by the 
Ministry of Agriculture will be paid by the government 
for the vouchers they receive from farmers. To receive 
such certification the staff of these firms have to 
participate in training courses taught by researchers or 
staff members of universities to ensure that they are 
able to do their job well (Kozari, 1999). 
In countries where farmers have to pay income tax, 
the accountants who prepare tax declarations have also 
entered into consultancy since they keep records which 
can be used for making better farm management 
decisions. Such firms also prepare the business plans 
required by a bank before honouring a loan application. 
Non-governmental organisations 
It is difficult to generalise about NGOs because they 
display a wide range of variation in their aims and 
motivations. An NGO can be a church related 
organisation which for religious reasons aims to improve 
the welfare of poor people. It can also be a group of 
entrepreneurs who earn their living by distributing grants 
from the government or from foreign donors to poor 
people. Another NGO might consist of a group of 
individuals who for political reasons want to increase 
the power of low status people in order for them to be 
able to influence their own future. 
The Indian Ministry of Rural Development often uses 
NGOs because it found that NGOs are better able than 
government agencies to work with poor people from 
the lower castes. An important goal of the Indian 
development policy is to decrease poverty and to help 
low caste people to organise themselves in such a way 
that they can better influence their own future. For this 
purpose the Ministry might contract an NGO to achieve 
specified changes, e.g. to introduce crossbred cows into 
a region with the additional condition that more than 
half of these cows should be with families who are 
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classified as poor. A problem with this approach is that 
the most important changes are also the most difficult 
to measure; for example it is easier to measure who has 
a cow than who manages this animal well. 
Another reason why extension services might be 
provided through NGOs and not through Ministry civil 
servants is to avoid working through an inefficient 
government bureaucracy. Compared to government 
extension agents, NGO staff are also often better trained 
to support group formation among farmers. These groups 
can play an important role in agricultural development. 
On the other hand, staff members of several NGOs lack 
the technical competence needed to advise farmers on 
how they can increase their productivity. The roles that 
NGOs can play in agricultural development have been 
analysed in detail by Farrington (1997). 
4 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAY 
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IS 
FINANCED 
There has been little research into the implications of 
the way extension is financed for the way extension is 
given or for the way the extension organisations operate. 
It may be useful to outline some topics which deserve 
further study. 
Flow of knowledge 
A feature of successful government agricultural extension 
organisations in several countries was the free flow of 
knowledge between researchers in different disciplines, 
extension agents and farmers. This made it possible to 
develop solutions for farmers' problems by integrating 
knowledge from different sources. Although the 
extension organisation usually lacked the staff to contact 
more than half of the farmers on a regular basis, local 
opinion leaders were often able to influence other 
farmers by way of example and through discussions 
with colleagues (van den Ban, 1965). This has changed 
drastically with the privatisation of extension services. 
Duijsings (1998), the deputy Chief Executive Officer of 
DLV, observed that privatisation and reduced govern-
ment funding create competition within the knowledge 
system, hampering the communication of extension with 
research, education, farmers' associations, private 
consultants, sales representatives and suppliers. Similar 
experiences in West Australia are reported by Marsh 
and Panelli (1998). 
Farmers who have paid for information and advice 
are less inclined to share this knowledge freely with 
their colleagues. This 'commoditisation' of knowledge 
may also reduce the consultants' access to farmers' 
experience and the freedom to use this information to 
help other farmers. Tacken (1998) the Chief Executive 
Officer of DLV reveals that the information his company 
needs to be able to give good advice comes to a large 
extent from farmers themselves. Although farmers have 
to pay for the information they receive from DLV, DLV 
does not pay farmers for the information it receives 
from them. How long are farmers willing to provide a 
consultancy firm with the information it needs to be 
able to earn money? In several countries farmers are 
reportedly now less willing to receive excursions of 
researchers or extensionists/consultants onto their farm 
than in the past, when knowledge was available for 
free. A good extension agent - by asking the right 
questions in a counselling process or by facilitating a 
group discussion among farmers — allowed farmers to 
realise for themselves the need for new management 
practices. Are farmers willing to pay the consultancy 
fee for an extension agent who continues to use this 
methodology? Donors have financed many consultancy 
firms to help governments develop and implement 
agricultural development strategies. In their reports one 
can find valuable information for development planning, 
but after the consultant has left the country it is often 
very difficult to find these reports. A similar development 
might happen now that consultants advise individual 
farmers. A firm which has developed an effective 
methodology for making farm plans.will often try to 
prevent competing firms from learning this methodology, 
whereas a government agent who developed such a 
methodology was proud if his colleagues also used it. 
Knowledge management 
The system of research-extension linkage is an important 
factor influencing the success of an extension 
organisation (Agbamu et al., this issue). In several 
government extension organisations there is a well 
established system of subject-matter specialists who keep 
field workers informed about relevant new 
developments in research and inform researchers about 
the problems and experiences of farmers. It can be 
difficult to organise this linkage in a consulting firm. 
There are many small consulting firms, andresearchers 
do not have the time to interact with all of them. 
Competition may make it difficult to bring consultants 
from different firms together in a training course. The 
advisers in the consulting firm are under pressure to 
work as many declarable hours as possible (Duijsings, 
1998), making it difficult for them to spend enough 
time interacting with researchers. On the other hand, a 
consulting firm may realise that their firm can only 
survive if their staff-are made aware of new 
developments in agriculture earlier than the staff of 
competing firms. By working in more countries they 
may gather a wider range of experience than staff 
members in national extension. Similarly, in commercial 
companies the staff will usually be quite well informed 
about the research done by its own research institutes, 
but they may have less access to the research done 
elsewhere, especially in the research institutes of 
competing firms. 
An advantage of extension by commercial companies 
is that they are able to realise an integration of 
communication of new knowledge, input supply, 
marketing and often also credit supply. Government 
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extension organisations may make recommendations 
for which the necessary inputs or credit are not available 
to their farmers, or which result in an increase in 
production which cannot then be sold in the market. 
This is much less likely with commercial extension, as 
shown by the example of cotton production in 
francophone African countries. 
There are NGOs which have a good linkage with 
agricultural research. For example, a large Indian NGO, 
Bharatiya Agro-Industries Foundation (BAIF), which 
works mainly in the field of animal husbandry, has its 
own research station with competent researchers. Its 
training centre not only gives training to staff members 
of BAIF but also to other NGOs and even government 
agencies. BAIF field staff are often considered to be 
more dynamic and more capable of helping farmers 
than the staff of the State Department of Animal 
Husbandry. However, it is often difficult to establish 
good linkages between staff of NGOs and those of 
agricultural research institutes and universities, because: 
• NGOs may see each other as competitors for 
government or donor funds. The researchers do not 
have the time to work with all NGOs separately, yet 
it is also difficult to bring them together for a regular 
exchange of experiences. 
• As mentioned previously, many staff members of 
NGOs are social scientists, who lack a basic training 
in agriculture. 
• Most of the research in developing countries is 
financed by the government and one of the roles of 
the researchers is to support government 
development agencies. 
The long-term success of an extension organisation 
depends to a large extent on the quality of the 
knowledge management in the organisation (e.g. van 
den Ban, 1999). It is quite important that all staff 
members are eager to discover and to develop new 
knowledge which is relevant for the work of the 
organisation. In some extension organisations managers 
see it as an important aspect of their task to stimulate 
new knowledge (Duijsings, 1998). Yet there are also 
government extension organisations in which managers 
are trained to maintain rules and regulations and do not 
stimulate the creativity of their staff or encourage them 
to learn from farmers' experience. 
Goals and accountability 
The goals an extension organisation tries to achieve are 
related to whom the staff of the organisation feel 
accountable. In a government organisation they may 
feel accountable to politicians who decide about the 
budget for extension and higher-ranking government 
officers who decide which staff member will be 
promoted. Alternatively, an extension agent may feel 
accountable to their farmers since it is the farmers who 
influence their status in the community. In many 
developing countries extension staff tend not to feel 
accountable to farmers since farmers often have a low 
status in society. In contrast, Dutch field-level extension 
agents largely used to feel accountable to farmers, 
particularly around 1970 when the budget for the 
extension service was secure and farmers had a higher 
social status in the community: they themselves would 
have liked to be farmers, but they lacked the required 
access to land and capital. 
The issue of accountability in NGOs is thoroughly 
discussed by Edwards and Hulme (1996). Since the 
financing of many NGOs is often insecure, both the 
management and staff try to please (potential) financiers 
because otherwise the continuity of their organisation 
would be in danger. NGO staff may also feel accountable 
to their directors or board of trustees who are often 
ideologically motivated, e.g. to empower poor people. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that the managers 
established their NGO in order to increase their own 
income: although they operate in a similar way to a 
consultancy firm, by calling themselves an NGO it may 
be easier to obtain money from donors. Such an NGO 
may not feel a high degree of responsibility towards its 
beneficiaries. 
The main goal of some NGOs is to implement welfare 
policies rather than to enhance the capabilities and 
knowledge that would allow rural people to increase 
their productivity. Politicians and rural people in 
developing countries often do not recognise that 
increasing knowledge can be a major way to improve 
productivity and hence to increase the income of poor 
people. In some countries NGOs are only allowed to 
work with permission of government regulators. 
Therefore the management of the NGOs tries to please 
these regulators, who may not approve of NGO attempts 
to change the power structure in the society. An NGO 
which is partly financed by the national government 
may also be unable to change this structure, even if the 
staff would like to do so. However, if it is financed by a 
foreign NGO, the contribution it makes to such a change 
in power structure may be an important criterion for 
the evaluation of its performance. 
In commercial companies and consulting firms the 
field staff feel accountable mainly to the management 
of their firm, which tries to judge how much each staff 
member contributes to its profit. Educating farmers to 
increase their capability to make better decisions is 
seldom seen as an effective way to increase this profit. 
It may be better for the company if the farmers remain 
dependant on the support of their (commercial) 
extension agent. These companies will try to increase 
the income of their customers and to obtain a small 
share of this increase for their company. 
The effectiveness of government extension 
organisations can be decreased by the influence of 
politicians on the selection of staff members, target 
groups and messages. For example, extension agents 
may come into difficulties if they refuse to spread 
propaganda for the party of the local member of 
parliament. Does privatisation of extension decrease 
these problems? 
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An important reason for governments to privatise their 
agricultural extension service has been that they have 
felt that they lack the budget to finance a large 
agricultural extension service. Therefore they have 
delegated this responsibility to organisations which raise 
their own budgets, e.g. farmers' associations, consulting 
firms or commercial companies. At the same time the 
government may use more money from its taxpayers or 
raise the prices of agricultural products to finance subsidy 
programmes for farmers . This may give a lower 
economic rate of return than investing in extension, but 
a higher political rate of return because the recipients 
of these subsidies or higher prices are willing to vote 
for politicians who supported the programmes. If this 
results in a lower increase in the productivity of 
agriculture, one should wonder whether the government 
can afford not to pay for agricultural extension. 
Everyone occasionally makes mistakes, and the same 
is true of extension agents. If a farmer follows incorrect 
advice from an extension agent, he or she may lose a 
lot of money. Is the extension organisation liable for 
these consequences or does the farmer have to pay for 
this loss? In this regard the laws and the jurisprudence 
are different in different countries. Government 
extension services may not be liable, but consulting 
firms often are. Therefore these firms may do all that is 
possible to prevent such mistakes, including not making 
recommendations in cases where some risk is involved. 
For extension provided by a commercial company the 
farmer can not only try to get the loss refunded in court 
but can also withhold his or her custom until the loss is 
refunded. 
Extension messages 
In many government extension organisations the choice 
of the extension messages is based either on the goals 
of the government policy or on research findings which 
are considered to be important for farmers. A consultant 
cannot earn a living by working in this way because 
farmers are only willing to pay for information or other 
help for which they feel a need. A good consultant can 
help farmers to discover that changes in their 
environment may mean that they need help with 
different problems than they encountered in the past. A 
major reason to privatise government extension services 
was that these services were not very effective in many 
countries because they did not provide the information 
which farmers felt they needed. Farmers are free to 
listen or not to listen to their extension agent: they will 
only take notice if they are convinced that the 
information the agent provides will help them to realise 
their goals or if they consider him a nice fellow. 
Increasingly extension agents are not only talking 
about production technologies but also about 
government rules and regulations and subsidy schemes, 
e.g. to reduce environmental problems. Government 
policies are most effective if farmers follow these rules 
and regulations voluntarily and use the subsidy schemes 
in the way they were intended by the government. This 
is most likely to happen if farmers are convinced that 
the government has made the right kind of policies. 
However, many farmers feel threatened in their ability 
to earn a good income and in their freedom to manage 
their farm in the way they like as a result of such policies. 
They may follow the rules out of fear of punishment 
but will change as little as possible. In this situation 
one cannot expect farmers to be eager to learn about 
these policies (Bahn, 1999). The chance that farmers 
accept these policies is highest when farmers themselves 
have participated in their design (van Woerkum, 1999). 
Farmers, leaders of environmental groups, policy makers 
and others may learn from each other by meeting to 
discuss the alternatives available to solve the problems 
involved. However, even if farmers are involved in 
designing these policies it is usually only a few leaders 
of farmers' associations who actively take part. 
Extension messages about government policies are 
quite important, but what type of organisation is willing 
to promote such messages? It is most likely that farmers 
will accept this information if it is provided by extension 
agents from their own farmers' association, even if the 
association is paid by the government for this work. 
However, there are two reasons why an association 
may not be willing to offer extension messages about 
government policies. Firstly, the association may lose 
members as a result. Secondly, the position of the 
farmers' association in its policy negotiations with the 
government may be weakened. Although the 
government may also want to contract a private 
consulting firm to teach farmers how they can reduce 
environmental problems, the firm may not be willing to 
accept this contract unless the extension messages are 
perceived by farmers to be in their interests. Commercial 
companies seldom see it as their task to explain 
government policies to their customers, though they 
would be willing to inform farmers about the subsidies 
available to buy their product. In cases where 
government extension services have been privatised, a 
unit is often maintained in the Ministry of Agriculture-to 
explain government policies to farmers. This unit may 
find it difficult to work effectively owing to a lack of 
understanding of the problems faced by farmers. 
Consequently there may be a lack of trust on the farmers' 
part. 
It is not only important that farmers understand 
government policies but also that policy makers 
understand farming and farmers. With a decreasing 
proportion of the labour force working in agriculture in 
many countries this becomes more important, yet at 
the same time more difficult. In many industrial countries 
farmers' associations have a public relations division to 
promote this understanding. In the Netherlands a 
commercial television station broadcasts a programme 
to illustrate how the most entrepreneurial farmers work 
and what problems they face. 
Since it is possible that commercial companies may 
try to cheat farmers by providing biased information, it 
is important that farmers are able to check whether the 
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information is true. In some countries farmers' associations 
or the government extension service play this role. 
Extension methods and approaches 
Many extension scientists are now convinced that it is 
no longer desirable to use a transfer of technology 
approach in which the extension administrators decide 
on the targets to be realised by the field-level extension 
agents. A more participatory approach is instead 
preferred, in which farmers decide which changes are 
desirable and what kinds of support are needed from 
extension to realise these changes (Roling and de Jong, 
1999; Haug, 1999). How are the possibilities for realising 
the changes needed related to the ways of financing 
the extension organisation? A participatory approach 
requires that the extension organisation becomes a 
learning organisation with the ability to discover which 
changes are desirable in each specific situation. It is 
easier to adopt a participatory approach or a farmer-led 
extension system within an NGO or a farmers' 
association than in a government extension organisation. 
To what extent can a government organisation which 
works nationwide adopt a participatory approach to 
extension? Which options do consultancy firms or 
commercial services have to select different extension 
approaches? 
One problem with a participatory approach can be 
that some farmers expect their extension agent to provide 
services for them (i.e. how to solve a problem), whereas 
the extension agent sees himself as an adult educator, 
whose role is to encourage farmers to develop solutions 
for themselves. For a consultant who needs the fees 
from his customers to earn a living, it can be more 
difficult to realise this educational role than for a 
government extension officer, who will not be financially 
penalised if he refuses to perform a service role. A farmer 
can put pressure on the extension agent of a commercial 
company to provide free services by threatening not to 
buy the company's products any longer. 
Target groups 
Whilst government extension organisations have been 
quite successful in increasing agricultural production 
through the introduction of high yielding varieties in 
high-potential, irrigated areas, they have been much 
less successful in helping farmers in diverse and risk-
prone rainfed areas to increase their income. 
Unfortunately we cannot claim that we know how best 
to assist farmers in complex and risk-prone 
environments. Some NGOs have been rather successful 
in helping farmers to increase their income and/or in 
making their farming system more sustainable through 
the use of participatory extension approaches. So far, 
however, these approaches have been successful only 
in small-scale projects (Garforth, 1997). We have yet to 
discover how such approaches can be scaled up to 
increase the productivity of millions of farmers, as is 
needed in many countries (Farrington, 1994). 
Many of the poorest people in the world are small 
farmers with a low level of productivity. Although 
agricultural research and extension ought to be able to 
offer opportunities to increase their productivity and 
hence their income, these poor farmers do not constitute 
an attractive target group for a consultancy firm or the 
extension division of a commercial company because 
there is little profit to be earned from working with 
these people. The very poorest farmers are seldom 
members of farmers' associations and therefore they do 
not form the target group of the extension service of 
such associations. Poor farmers can be an important 
target group for a government extension service where 
the goal of government extension is to decrease income 
differences. However, experience shows that even 
government extension services work mainly with the 
larger farmers. This may be because increasing national 
food production is a more important policy goal than 
decreasing income differences; because poor farmers 
have little political power; because it is difficult to work 
with resource poor farmers who have a low level of 
education; or simply because neither extension agents 
nor researchers know how to increase the income of 
poor farmers. 
Consequently, it is often left to NGOs to target the 
poorest farmers. In some cases NGOs have been 
successful in helping these farmers, especially where 
there is an increased market demand for products which 
can be produced on small farms with a surplus of labour, 
e.g. vegetables. If a government is not willing to finance 
support to these poor farmers, it can expect that serious 
social problems will develop in the country (Sachs, 
1999). The international community is beginning to 
realise that the increasing income difference between 
rich and poor countries is a serious danger for social 
and political stability. 
The target group with which an extension organisation 
works depends ^partly on decisions made by the 
organisation but also on decisions made by farmers. 
This second possibility is often neglected in the literature, 
but some farmers realise that in order to compete with 
other farmers they need good advice. In general we 
see that those who have most knowledge are also more 
eager to obtain new knowledge from extension 
organisations and other information sources. Farmers 
will also decide from which extension organisation to 
seek advice. This decision is partly based on costs and 
partly on confidence. For example, a farmer may know 
the cost of the fee needed to pay a consultancy firm for 
their advice, but not how much he or she pays for this 
advice from a commercial company where these costs 
are included in the price of the product. A farmer may 
have more confidence in the ability of his or her own 
farmers' association to serve his/her interests than that 
of a government extension service. However, the 
personality of the field-level extension agent is often 
more important than the organisation for which he 
works. 
It has been mentioned above that extension from a 
consultancy is mainly useful in helping a farmer to solve 
a specific problem rather than a problem which is faced 
. by many farmers. These specific problems are probably 
16 
Perspectives on agricultural extension 
more frequent now than they were a generation ago 
because farms have become more specialised; farmers 
try to produce more for niche markets and often combine 
farming with off-farm income sources (Schwartz, 1994). 
In consultancy more attention is probably given to 
management advice than to the adoption of new 
technologies and practices: In which situations is this 
desirable? 
Management of the extension 
organisation 
In commercial companies and in consulting firms profit 
is an important criterion for management decisions. Staff 
members are not paid according to their age or level of 
education, as was often the case in government 
organisations, but according to the contribution they 
make to realising this profit. How valid are the criteria 
which are used to measure this contribution? What are 
the consequences of the use of these criteria for the 
relationship between farmers and the consultants? 
When a farmer asks for help from a consulting firm, 
he/she knows the cost of this advice. The cost of help 
provided by a commercial company is hidden in the 
price of the product, possibly reducing the incentive 
for cooperation in a cost-effective way between the 
farmer and the adviser. If extension is free many farmers 
prefer to receive services rather than education. It is 
argued that the cost of extension provided through 
consulting firms or commercial companies is lower than 
through a government extension service, because these 
firms and companies have to be cost conscious in order 
to make a profit. On the other hand, in situations where 
there may be many different firms, companies or NGOs 
working in the same area, the combined costs of 
travelling and of staff training will be higher than for 
one government extension service. We do not yet know 
which way of financing agricultural extension is most 
costly. 
It has also been suggested that the cost of extension 
might be reduced by replacing personal contact between 
farmers and extension agents by mass media or by 
information and communication technology. Whilst these 
are undoubtedly useful, research has clearly shown that 
they are mainly effective in the first stages of the adoption 
process and have to be supplemented by interpersonal 
communication in later stages (e.g. van den Ban and 
Hawkins, 1996). 
A study on the privatisation of different government 
organisations in the Netherlands found that after 
privatisation their performance increased by 30 to 200 
per cent, partly because the staff services decreased in 
number and in size (de Koning et al., 1997). Similar 
findings have also been reported for the extension 
service (Tacken, 1998). With privatisation, the extension 
management system changed from an input-directed 
system to an output-directed system: i.e. the criteria for 
evaluation changed from inputs (e.g. the number of 
farmers' meetings) to outputs such as change at the 
farm level. Such a change in organisational culture is 
not easy to realise. 
In many developing countries the salaries of the 
government extension agents are so low that they have 
to find an extra source of income for the survival of 
their family. One possibility is to ask the farmers they 
visit to give them some of their products. 
It is also possible that the extension agent can earn 
extra money by selling seeds, agrochemicals, etc. The 
danger in this is that agents' may recommend those 
products for which they or their organisation can earn 
most, rather than those which are most beneficial to the 
farmer. This apparently happens sometimes in the 
Chinese government extension service, which is 
expected to earn part of its budget by selling inputs to 
farmers. On the other hand, there is no use in advising 
farmers to apply inputs which they cannot access 
because the input distribution system is ineffective. 
Economic theories 
The most influential publications on the privatisation of 
extension are written by economists who often work 
with the World Bank (e.g. Umali and Schwartz, 1994). 
One wonders whether the economic theories they use 
to analyse this topic are still valid in the present era. A 
basic assumption of these theories is that if costs of 
production decrease, production will increase and 
suppliers can sell their products for a lower price, leading 
to an increase in demand. In this way a new balance 
between supply and demand is achieved. However, as 
Shapiro and Varian (1999) have shown, this assumption 
is not valid for the production of knowledge distributed 
through a communication network such as the Internet. 
Here a decrease in price results in an increase in the 
number of participants in the network and in this way 
in an increase in the supply of knowledge which is 
available. Contrary to economic theory, the distribution 
of scarce goods is no longer the basic problem, and the 
cost of multiplying information has been lowered. 
Instead, the problem becomes one of electing the most 
relevant knowledge and integrating knowledge from 
different sources. It is not yet clear what implications 
this paradigm shift in economic theory might have for 
decisions on financing agricultural extension. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In many countries we see the-development of a pluriform 
extension system in which only a part of the extension 
service is either provided or funded by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Other organisations such as commercial 
companies or NGOs may be involved both in providing 
and funding extension services, and farmers themselves 
may also help to finance these services. The question 
of how one can promote cooperation and coordination 
between these various organisations is discussed by 
Rivera and Gustafson (1991). Although it is hard to 
defend public funding of agricultural extension if the 
benefit is only for the farmers who use this service, 
there are many situations where the public at large also 
profits from the extension services, e.g. by lower prices 
for their food or a reduction in environmental problems 
brought about by a change in production. 
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The analysis presented in this paper broadly confirms 
the findings of Rivera and Cary (1997), who conclude 
that government-funded extension is likely to focus its 
activities on public good activities which the market 
place is unlikely to provide. Such activities include 
'broad' rather than 'specific' technology transfer, 
dissemination of environmental and resource technology, 
and human resource development. Some additional 
points can also be made: 
• It is important to analyse what effects the financing 
of extension (and research) will have on the flow 
and management of information, the choice of 
extension goals, methods used and the groups 
targeted. 
• In deciding who pays for extension one should take 
into account the wider benefits brought about by an 
increase in the efficiency of agricultural production 
and associated decrease in the cost of food. 
• In countries with the highest levels of productivity, 
agricultural labour productivity is over 100 times as 
high as in the countries with the lowest levels of 
productivity (World Bank, 1998). Extension in 
countries with high productivity levels should be 
financed quite differently from those with low 
productivity levels. 
• In countries where the price policy causes surpluses 
of agricultural products, one cannot expect that the 
government will be willing to pay an extension 
service to increase agricultural production. 
• Farmers have to make a range of very different 
decisions. The optimal way of financing agricultural 
extension depends on which type of decisions one 
tries to improve. Advice from a consultant paid by 
the farmer is most desirable for farm-specific 
investment decisions. 
• The way of financing agricultural extension 
influences to whom the extension agents feel that 
they are accountable. This affects whether they try 
to work in the interest of (a certain group of) farmers, 
government policies, politicians, managers/ 
shareholders of their organisation or others. 
• Extension messages about government policies 
should be financed in a different way from extension 
which tries to help farmers to increase their 
productivity and their income. 
Decisions on the privatisation of agricultural extension 
are often based on very limited knowledge about the 
consequences of such a change. More research in this 
area is urgently needed. There is more experience of 
privatisation in industrial countries than in developing 
countries. Extension administrators in developing 
countries should make use of this experience in their 
decisions. But of course, they may also have to consider 
whether the recommendations of a consultant from an 
industrial country are really valid in their situation. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Technologies and practices can also be combined, 
e.g. with the introduction of a new seed variety which 
gives an optimal yield when it is sown at a different 
time than the varieties used in the past (Bennett, 
1996). 
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